“If indeed jurisdiction is supplied, Catholic common sense would seem to insist that it is supplied only to those sacred ministers (like Bishop Roy and others, including Bishop Sanborn) who are committed to laboring with the Church in the work of sanctification, as opposed to those who labor in total opposition to her.”
So concluded the previous post. Picking up where we left off:
My priest friend also made an appeal to the “Matter and Form” argument put forth in the Thesis, saying that it is “basic philosophy, in fact quintessentially fundamental.”
Let’s consider what thethesis.us (the website published by the RCI to defend the Thesis) has to say on this note:
The scholastic distinction between matter and form is commonly used by the Church to explain doctrinal, moral, and canonical questions. Its analogical application to the papacy is commonly taught by theologians.[4] Between the election and the acceptance, the designated subject has the ultimate disposition to receive authority. THE THESIS recognizes, on the one hand, the pope-elect status of the person designated by the cardinals, since papal elections must be assumed valid until the Church legally declares otherwise, and on the other hand demonstrates that a proper acceptance of the election has not occurred by reason of an obstacle (defect of intention).
The footnote provided in support of the above (referenced by the numeral [4]) reads as follows:
Saint Robert Bellarmine: “When Cardinals create the Pontiff, they exercise their authority not over the Pontiff, because he does not yet exist; but over the matter, that is, over the person whom they dispose in a certain measure through election, that he might receive the form of the pontificate from God.” De Romano Pontifice, lib II, cap. XXX.
The unfortunate fact is that the above from Bellarmine is being taken well beyond the context in which it was offered.
On closer examination, one finds that Bellarmine was specifically addressing the opinion of Cajetan who believed that “a heretical Pope who is truly Pope can be deposed by the Church.” The Doctor’s intent was simply to dispatch with Cajetan’s failed attempt to cite the proceedings that take place at a papal conclave as a meaningful analogy in support of the idea that the Church is able to depose a reigning pope. That is the context.
Note very well that the argument in this case does not concern a man merely elected pope, but rather one “who is truly Pope.”
Moreover, Bellarmine says, “When Cardinals create the Pontiff…” It is perfectly clear, therefore, that he is discussing a conclave from which a true pope emerges, i.e., a man who actually received the form of the pontificate from God.
In no way does Bellarmine’s statement shed light on a conclave during which the man elected accepts his election albeit with defective intent, much less do his words suggest that the same man emerges with material possession of the papacy.
Note as well that this citation is being offered as evidence that the scholastic distinction between matter and form is commonly used by the Church … and its analogical application to the papacy is commonly taught by theologians.
If indeed it is true that analogies to matter and form are “commonly taught by theologians” with respect to the papacy – and this in a manner that would lend support to the Thesis – one would think that a more convincing citation, offered in context, could have easily been found and provided.
Could it be that there are no traditional, pre-conciliar citations that, when read in context, actually suggest the conclusions proposed in the Thesis?
It would seem so.
In another failed attempt to defend their position, thethesis.us states the following:
That juridical acts (or more precisely, legal transactions) require a proper intention to posit them is universally recognized by moralists and canonists.
The authors then go on to provide the following citation from the Dictionary of Moral Theology, by Roberti and Palazzini, 1962:
By legal transaction is ordinarily understood a juridical act consisting in a direct manifestation of intention or will to produce a juridical effect. Hence, the essential requisites of every legal transaction are: (a) will or intention of the subject or subjects; (b) their competence (natural or legal), for the will-factor alone has no effect before the law, unless it emanates from a competent subject; (c) external manifestation, without which the internal will has no legal force or value. [Boldface added on thethesis.us]
I find this stunning. If one reads the above carefully and without bias – that is, without already having decided that the Thesis is entirely correct – it actually seems to refute the Thesis more so than to support its claims.
Both the Thesis and the Dictionary of Moral Theology point to intention as essential in producing a juridical effect. The Thesis insists that proper intent is lacking in the case of the conclaves that conferred the material aspect of the papacy upon the “Vatican II popes” (as they call them).
So, what effect does the defect of intent have on the juridical act carried out by the conclave?
The Dictionary of Moral Theology tells us in the following citation which, oddly enough, is also provided on thethesis.us:
When the external manifestation does not coincide with the internal will, or when the external manifestation is executed in a manner or form other than that prescribed by the law, the act or transaction is considered to be null and void. [Boldface added on thethesis.us]
NB: Roberti and Palazzini, whose commentary is provided on thethesis.us, emphasize that the result of a defective will (or intent) with respect to the parties involved in a juridical transaction is such that the act or transaction is considered to be null and void.
Applying this principle to a papal conclave, the juridical transaction – that is, the election – is null and void.
Proponents of the Thesis, however, carry on as if the election is, and remains, valid, and the juridical effect of conferring material possession of the papacy upon the man elected endures despite the defect of intent. This conclusion is directly opposed to the commentary offered by the moralists and canonists Roberti and Palazzini.
Like I said, stunning.
Not cited on thethesis.us is the following very clear statement taken from the same section of the Dictionary of Moral Theology:
The lack of any one of these essential requisites [cited above, including the intention of the subjects], as also the illegality of the transaction, renders the act null and void – that is to say, the transaction is not recognized by law as having any juridical effects. [Emphasis in original]
Pay close attention: The lack of right intent on the part of the subjects renders the act – in this case, the election, “null and void,” i.e., the process carried out by the conclaves that elected Ratzinger, Bergoglio, and Prevost, had no juridical effect.
How many times do Thesis proponents need to read null and void, no legal effect, not recognized by law, not any juridical effect, and this from their very own sources, before they question the validity of their position?
But wait, there’s more…
A careful reading of the initial citation offered from the Dictionary of Moral Theology makes plain that the authors are addressing the intent of all of the parties to a given legal transaction. This would seem to indicate, with regard to a papal conclave, right intent on the part of the electors is every bit as crucial as the intent of the man elected.
It is manifestly clear that the cardinal electors of Ratzinger, Bergoglio, and Prevost acted with the same defective intent as the men they elected.
So, according to the very source provided on thethesis.us, this means that the entire act is null and void, i.e., these men did not receive material possession of the papacy, not according to me, but rather according to the expert testimony of Roberti and Palazzini as put forth in the Dictionary of Moral Theology.
At this, I see no choice but to conclude that the Thesis, although initially conceived in good faith, is not only highly doubtful, it is actually disproven by its proponents’ very own arguments.
